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ARTICLE
COMMON LAW PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
SOMETHING FOR EVERYONE?
DOUG RENDLEMAN*
Common law punitive damages have some feature that will get every-
one’s goat: a civil court meting out quasi-criminal punishment; a sanction,
punishment, imposed after mere civil procedure; a civil jury stretching im-
precise instructions into Robin Hood justice; a private plaintiff receiving a
windfall that exceeds any reasonable estimate of loss; and, finally, the Su-
preme Court wielding the discredited doctrine of substantive due process.
This article will examine the preceding fault lines and the counter-
vailing considerations, devoting more attention to substantive due process
than the others. It will then turn to Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,1 and in-
clude some modest conclusions of my own.
I. PROBLEMS WITH PUNITIVE DAMAGES, GENERALLY
How has the controversial common law doctrine of punitive damages
been developed, maintained, and kept within sensible bounds? The United
States has no single private law court. The federal courts and the United
States Supreme Court focus on the public law of the Constitution and fed-
eral statutes, not on common law reasoning and decision-making. The fifty
states and the District of Columbia have fifty-one common law torts sys-
tems. All but five have common law or court-made punitive damages, de-
veloped and maintained by the state’s judiciary with legislative oversight
and within federal and state constitutional limits. The states’ punitive dam-
ages doctrines are broadly similar, but they diverge in detail.
* Huntley Professor, Washington and Lee Law School.  Thanks to the University of St.
Thomas Law Journal for sponsoring both the splendid conference, Exxon Valdez Revisited:
Rights and Remedies, and this important symposium.  Thanks to the Frances Lewis Law Center
for summer research support.  Particular thanks to the University of St. Thomas Law Journal
editors and staff for their assiduous, conscientious, and professional assistance in bringing this
article to print.
1. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.Ct. 2605 (2008).
1
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Civil Punishment
The first fault line is civil punishment, which punitive damages oppo-
nents maintain is a contradiction in terms. A bright line, a clear division in
the law, separates civil law and criminal law. The civil-criminal division
runs through lawyers’ practices, legal codes, law libraries, and the law
school curriculum. Civil punitive damages breach this division because they
implement criminal law purposes—punishment and deterrence. Punitive
damages are misplaced, or at best incongruous, on the legal system’s civil
side, which—in contrast to the criminal side—is devoted to compensation
and restoration. A European court will give this as a reason to refuse to
recognize a United States punitive damages verdict.2 Implementation of this
abolitionist argument would end civil punitive damages.
The Maine Supreme Court, a pragmatic common law court, responded
that the criminal-civil line in United States law is neither clear nor straight.
Civil courts and the civil law play a role in defining and punishing defend-
ants’ misconduct. Some things, the court continued, are wrong but not
crimes. Some crimes are not prosecuted. Some criminal statutes are not
enforced. Some criminal penalties are too low to deter a miscreant’s
breaches. Thus, the Maine court held, courts’ administration of common
law punitive damages plays an important role in maintaining social order.3
Inadequate Procedural Protections
The critics’ second fault line is that civil courts build punitive damages
on a civil procedure foundation. Before a court may impose punishment, a
defendant is entitled to a formidable array of procedural protections, based
on the Constitution and statutes which are intended to protect the defendant
against an incorrect criminal conviction. Punitive damages advance crimi-
nal purposes and punish a defendant, but without according him that protec-
tive criminal procedure. A punitive damages defendant should be entitled to
criminal procedure protections like the requirement of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt and protection against self-incrimination and double jeop-
ardy. Fully implemented, this second point would move punitive damages
across the civil-criminal watershed. Partially implemented, it would create
hybrid procedure.
The Maine court responded that a common law civil court can protect
a punitive damages defendant satisfactorily.4 This court created a hybrid
procedure by exercising its common law power, rejecting proof by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, and requiring a punitive damages plaintiff to
prove the prerequisites for imposing punitive damages by clear and con-
2. John Y. Gotanda, Charting Developments Concerning Punitive Damages: Is the Tide
Changing?, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 510–11 (2007).
3. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1355–57 (Me. 1985).
4. Id. at 1356–57.
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vincing evidence.5  Requiring clear and convincing evidence for punitive
damages has been established by statute or decision in more than half the
states.6
A civil litigant may claim the privilege against self-incrimination; but
unlike a criminal defendant, the civil litigant may be summoned as a wit-
ness, questioned, and required to claim the privilege in response to each
question; the opponent may then refer to the witness’s silence in closing
argument. A punitive damages defendant may also be charged with a crime.
For example, a drunken driver may be both charged with criminal man-
slaughter for a fatal accident and sued in civil court for wrongful death.
This double defendant is usually protected from self-incrimination by a stay
that requires the civil plaintiff to wait until after criminal proceedings are
completely wrapped up.
The defendant may be both convicted of a crime and held responsible
for punitive damages. Civil punitive damages are not double jeopardy.7
Moreover a trial judge may protect a punitive damages defendant who has
been punished criminally from double punishment by telling the civil puni-
tive damages jury about the defendant’s criminal conviction.8
Runaway Juries
The jury is punitive damages’ third fault line. Critics of punitive dam-
ages recount horror stories about runaway civil juries acting on emotion
rather than reason, and marring the legal landscape with eye-popping, redis-
tributionist punitive damages verdicts. As Justice O’Connor wrote in
dissent:
The jury system has long been a guarantor of fairness, a bulwark
against tyranny, and a source of civic values. . . . But jurors are
not infallible guardians of the public good. . . . Arbitrariness, ca-
price, passion, bias, and even malice can replace reasoned judg-
ment and law as the basis for jury decisionmaking. Modern
judicial systems therefore incorporate safeguards against such in-
fluences. . . . Courts long have recognized that jurors may view
large corporations with great disfavor. . . . [J]uries may feel privi-
leged to correct perceived social ills stemming from unequal
wealth distribution by transferring money from “wealthy” corpo-
rations to comparatively needier plaintiffs.9
5. Id. at 1362–63.
6. DOUG RENDLEMAN, REMEDIES 130 (7th ed. 2006).
7. Tuttle, 494 A.2d at 1357.
8. Id. at 1356. A punitive damages defendant may, however, perceive this so-called protec-
tion as inviting the jury to view it (i.e. the defendant) as a proved offender and to pile on civil
punishment.
9. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 473, 474, 490, 491 (1993)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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Criticism of the civil jury is central to tort reformers’ portrayal of juries
shoveling defendants’ hard-earned money at greedy plaintiffs and their trial
lawyers in tasseled loafers.10
State and federal civil juries are, of course, constitutional features in
the United States legal environment.11 A populistic civil jury will articulate
and implement the community conscience and sentiment. The jury serves as
an equalizer for the common person against those defendants who abuse
power.
Jury discretion is built into the punitive damages process providing the
jury flexible responses to defendants and their misdeeds. There are two
stages of jury discretion: first, whether to grant punitive damages, and sec-
ond, in what amount. Following the judge’s flexible and general jury in-
struction, the punitive damages jury, in effect, defines the qualifying
misconduct and sets the amount of punishment. Protecting the jury’s verdict
is part of the deference judges owe to that constitutional institution.12
Among other nations, the United States civil jury is an anomaly, for
most other countries lack the civil jury.13 In the common law nations with
punitive damages—United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Austra-
lia—punitive damages are low and infrequent, perhaps because the United
States’ jury-trial tradition is absent.14
The United States’ legal system is, however, ambivalent about the
jury. Litigants can opt out. Merely three percent of filed civil lawsuits reach
trial, and many of these are tried without a jury.15 All or nearly all of the
punitive damages lawsuits we are studying are jury trials. After placing the
jury on a constitutional pedestal, courts and legislatures hedge its freedom
with pretrial motions, evidence rules, the judge’s instructions, and post-ver-
dict judicial review.16
An explanation of post-verdict judicial review will be useful here be-
cause of its importance to punitive damages below. After a jury’s punitive
damages verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant files its motion for a new
trial arguing, among other things, an excessive verdict. The defendant will
ask the trial judge to grant a conditional new trial or remittitur—that is, to
tell the plaintiff to either accept lower damages or submit to a new trial on
damages.17 The common law standards that the trial judge will apply to the
10. See American Tort Reform Association, About ATRA, http://www.atra.org/about (last
visited March 19, 2010).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; VA. CONST. art. 1 § 11; MN. CONST. art. 1 § 4.
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
13. John Y. Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT’L L. 391, 396–97 (2004).
14. Id. at 398–439, 441.
15. STEPHEN YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 473 (7th ed. 2008).
16. FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 7.20–23 (5th ed. 2001).
17. RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 9.6, at 466–67 (2d ed. 2009); JAMES, supra note
16, at § 7.29.
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defendant’s remittitur motion are: whether the jury acted out of passion and
prejudice, or whether the jury’s verdict shocks the judge’s conscience.18 A
common law appellate court reviews a judge’s excessive damages decision
only to determine whether it was an abuse of discretion.19 Nevertheless, a
jury’s punitive damages verdict will be vulnerable to post-verdict judicial
review, and is often reduced or settled during that period.20 Empirical stud-
ies have shown that punitive damages do not menace Western Civilization
as we know it.21 There are not that many punitive damages verdicts; only
six percent of plaintiffs’ verdicts include punitive damages. Furthermore,
punitive damages verdicts are not very high, averaging around $50,000.22
However, a few titanic jury verdicts for punitive damages grab head-
lines, capture public and professional attention, and reinforce anecdotal ste-
reotypes of juries run amok. Like the $145 billion punitive damages jury
verdict in a Florida smokers’ class action, many of these verdicts are re-
versed.23 Among those reduced is the $5 billion punitive damages jury ver-
dict from the Exxon Valdez oil spill, which will be discussed below. Many
others are settled by the parties without a judicial decision.
Unpredictability
The critics’ fourth punitive damages fault line is vagueness leading to
unpredictability. The rules that govern punitive damages—both whether to
grant them and how much to give—are imprecise.24 Critics maintain that a
vague general instruction delegates too much discretion to the jury, in ef-
fect, to create law and apply it retroactively to punish the defendant. Plain-
tiff’s lawyer’s effective advocacy to “send them a message” leads
defendants to unpredictable bet-the-company trials and to potentially crush-
ing jury verdicts for punitive damages. Allowing the jury to punish a defen-
dant with vague standards develops imprecise rules; the law becomes
18. FREER, supra note 17; JAMES, supra note 16, at § 7.29.
19. FREER, supra note 17; JAMES, supra note 16, at § 7.29.
20. See Kip Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 53 EMORY L.J. 1426
(2004).
21. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical
Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 745 (2002); see also Thomas A. Eaton et al., Another Brick in the
Wall: An Empirical Look at Georgia Tort Litigation in the 1990s, 34 GA. L. REV. 1049, 1094–95
(2000) (interpreting research about civil trials in Georgia and concluding that punitive damages
are “exceedingly rare” and that the “frequency and size of punitive damage awards belie the
popular image of a system beset with runaway juries”). Rockbridge County where I live is in an
apparent punitive-damages-free zone, no such verdict having been returned in living memory.
Doug Rendleman, A Cap on the Defendant’s Appeal Bond?: Punitive Damages Tort Reform, 39
AKRON L. REV. 1089, 1168–69 (2006).
22. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 623, 633 (1997).
23. Engle v. Liggett Group, 945 So. 2d 1246, 1263–64 (Fla. 2006).
24. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 n.15 (1982).
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unstable and unpredictable, undermining people’s ability to plan and
predict.25
The response is that a potential wrongdoer ought to be wary instead of
trying to run just inside the line. The theory behind a randomized deterrent
response is that if the system cannot catch all wrongdoers, then when it
does catch a wrongdoer, it should be hit hard.26
Windfalls
A windfall is the critics’ fifth fault line. Punitive damages perforce
exceed plaintiff’s compensation. Plaintiff and plaintiff’s lawyers receive the
money. In short, critics maintain giving this much money to plaintiff and
company in the form of punitive damages is wrong.
To begin with, the word “windfall” is ambiguous. In general, a wind-
fall describes an unexpected benefit. In the most technical sense, a windfall
apple is blown from my neighbor’s tree, falls in my yard, and becomes my
apple. On the legal side of the fence, the death intestate of a previously
unknown great aunt may drop a windfall inheritance on her grand niece. A
windfall is a kind of bonus, perhaps undeserved (in the South’s vernacular,
a lagniappe—the thirteenth donut in a dozen).
In damages, a windfall may mean to some a jury verdict or court judg-
ment that exceeds plaintiff’s compensatory damages; if so, all punitive
damages are windfalls. Compensatory damages fall under imprecise head-
ings, for example, pain and suffering. So, windfall pain and suffering dam-
ages may mean plaintiff recovered more compensatory damages than the
speaker or writer thinks she deserves, which is entirely subjective. It would
be technically accurate to define a plaintiff’s punitive damages that exceed
punitive damages’ punishment-deterrence policy justification as a windfall
for the plaintiff. But that decision requires a judgment that varies from per-
son to person. “Windfall” in the legal vocabulary is, therefore, an opprobri-
ous epithet, meaningless except to express the speaker or writer’s disfavor.
Punitive damages are recovery in addition to plaintiff’s compensatory
damages. The critics’ anti-windfall argument negates the reasons courts
take a defendant’s money with punitive damages: punishment and
deterrence.
Looking at the plaintiff’s side of the lawsuit, why would the court
grant damages that exceed plaintiff’s compensation? Why create what crit-
ics name a windfall by giving the defendant’s punitive damages to the
plaintiff? Other policies support the money’s destination, the plaintiff. Pro-
25. See Leo M. Romero, Punitive Damages, Criminal Punishment, and Proportionality: The
Importance of Legislative Limits, 41 CONN. L. REV. 109, 151–60 (2008); Catherine M. Sharkey,
The Exxon Valdez Litigation Marathon: A Window on Punitive Damages, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
25, 34 (2009).
26. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 187 (1980).
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fessor Ellis’s leading article ascribed multiple purposes to punitive dam-
ages.27 In addition to the reasons to take the defendant’s money—punishing
the defendant, specifically deterring this defendant from repeating, and de-
terring other potential defendants from similar misconduct—courts have
three reasons to give defendant’s punitive damages money to the plaintiff.
These are, first, to obviate the victim’s retaliation and preserve the peace;
second, to compensate plaintiff’s losses not measured under compensatory
damages; and third, to finance litigation, mostly to pay the plaintiff’s attor-
ney fees.28 Stated another way, punitive damages may be a bounty to create
an incentive for a victim to become a plaintiff, to encourage that plaintiff to
hire a competent lawyer to bag that predator, take it to court, and finally, to
finance the plaintiff’s lawyer’s litigation.
The law of damages is saddled with an inadequate vocabulary. In addi-
tion to the vagueness of windfall, legal speakers often say damages includ-
ing punitive damages are an award. But damages are not a prize like an
Academy Award for Best Picture. A plaintiff’s compensatory damages are
almost always a substitute for something defendant impaired. A plaintiff’s
punitive damages serve the substantive purposes discussed above. Punitive
damages are not a prize. This article tries to refer to punitive damages as a
“verdict” to focus on the jury’s role in punitive damages.
Pain and suffering and emotional distress damages are often said to be
non-economic. People, however, pay to avoid injury. They demand a pre-
mium for encountering risk of injury. Plaintiff’s injury is not encountered in
money, but her damages are measured in money as a substitute. The wiser
approach is to think of these forms of damages as non-pecuniary, but still
economic.29 Because the jury must value plaintiff’s loss in money when she
didn’t encounter the loss in money, non-pecuniary verdicts vary, sometimes
widely.
The damages branch of remedies is a science of the second best be-
cause the court substitutes defendant’s money for the harm defendant’s mis-
conduct caused to plaintiff. Suppose a tortfeasor injured Clara’s foot so
seriously that she can’t continue her running regimen. She sues the
tortfeasor and recovers damages for pain and suffering, the lost enjoyment
of life.30 Should Clara take the money and buy a wide-screen television to
watch other people run? Punitive damages, a little harder to perceive as a
substitute, serve policies the law considers to be worthwhile. But if Clara
27. Ellis, supra note 24, at 3; see also Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to
Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 1014–15 (2007) (discussing punitive damages for compensation
and private retribution); Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstand-
ing the History of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 163 (2003).
28. Ellis, supra note 24.
29. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.12 (7th ed. 2007).
30. See, e.g., Yosuf v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 432, 439 (M.D.Pa. 1986) (recovering for
an injured hand); Payton v. City of New Orleans, 679 So. 2d 446, 452 (La. App. 1996) (recovering
for an injured knee).
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recovers punitive damages for the defendant’s aggravated misconduct, al-
though she may have punished the tortfeasor, she still has lost her ability to
run.
Environmental harm raises similar issues of value and substitution.
Professor Alexandra Klass wrote that plaintiffs’ harm leading to compensa-
tory damages comprises only part of an environmental tortfeasor’s total
wrongdoing. She began with the idea that environmental laws are under-
enforced. Moreover, harm to natural resources is difficult to monetize, be-
cause like pain and suffering, it is not encountered as pecuniary. Compensa-
tory damages fail to recognize many kinds of environmental harm;
measuring compensatory damages by the cost to restore or diminution in
value omits public harm. For example, Native Alaskans could not recover
for losing their subsistence culture to the Exxon Valdez oil spill.31
Valuing environmental harm raises even more nettlesome issues. Sup-
pose Clara has watched and banded migrating Monarch butterflies for over
a decade. Then, suppose that a tortfeasor does harm to the migrating
Monarchs so that they no longer land at Clara’s rural Minnesota home.
What is the value of visits by migrating butterflies?
Butterflies do not have “use” value. What is the non-use value of a
butterfly to Clara, a butterfly-watcher? It is practically impossible to quan-
tify. Another approach is to estimate the butterflies’ “legacy” value. That is,
will the butterflies be there for Clara’s grandchildren? A little farther afield,
what is the value to me of Clara’s butterflies?  Finally, an extinct type of
butterfly or a destroyed eco-system may have had contained something with
medical value.
Other possible ways of valuing environmental injury fall under the
heads of willingness-to-pay (“WTP”), and willingness-to-accept (“WTA”)
surveys. What would Clara pay for the butterflies? What would Clara
charge for losing them? In the form of a public opinion poll, WTP and
WTA may provide some guidance about a resource’s value.32 Examining
the uncertainty above, Professor Dale Thompson, in contrast to Professor
Klass, favors the restoration approach, in part because the foregoing meth-
ods of setting value are indirect and artificial.33
Professor Klass asked courts to recognize punitive damages policies
beyond punishment and deterrence, to consider potential harm and harm
that cannot be monetized. Defendant’s harm to the environment, Klass ar-
gued, should encompass harm beyond plaintiff’s compensatory damages
when a court calculates the amount of punitive damages. Writing prior to
31. Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 MINN. L. REV. 83, 118–26
(2007). See Leo M. Romero, Punishment for Ecological Disasters: Punitive Damages and/or
Criminal Sanctions, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 154, 158 (2009).
32. RENDLEMAN, supra note 6, at 791–94.
33. Dale Thompson, Valuing the Environment: Courts’ Struggles with Natural Resource
Damages, 32 ENVTL. L. 57, 76–78 (2002).
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the Supreme Court’s Exxon decision, she asked courts adjudicating environ-
mental torts to impose punitive damages that exceed the single-digit, 9:1
ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages.34 As we will examine
below, the Court’s decision dashed her hopes.
Another response to the ambivalence or antipathy critics express about
giving plaintiffs punitive damages that far exceed compensation is a split-
recovery system to divert a percentage of a plaintiff’s punitive damages
judgment for public-use by the state or local government. Responding to
concerns about plaintiffs’ windfalls, Professor Catherine Sharkey advocated
what she named societal compensation that would reduce plaintiffs’ exces-
sive punitive damages recoveries by spreading the wealth in consumer-pro-
tection punitive damages.35
Professor Klass applied Professor Sharkey’s idea to environmental de-
fendants.36 However, as we will examine below, the Supreme Court has
circumscribed a tort plaintiff’s recovery of punitive damages for defen-
dant’s harm to non-parties.37 This erodes the professors’ cogent arguments
for punitive damages and split-recovery systems.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Our final fault line in punitive damages is substantive due process.
This subject requires some background because it is a fault line de-empha-
sized by critics of punitive damages.
Courts began to mete out punitive damages for an individual defen-
dant’s misconduct when someone committed an intentional, malicious tort,
fraud, libel, or battery. For example, a dance instructor told his pre-adoles-
cent students that having sex with him would reduce their inhibitions.38
During the middle part of the twentieth century, plaintiffs’ litigation
developed what I call “consumer-protection punitive damages.” The plain-
tiff is a wronged consumer; the defendant is not an individual human, but a
large business corporation. Examples of consumer-protection punitive dam-
ages from the Supreme Court’s punitive damages decisions include insur-
ance bad faith39 and tobacco products liability.40
A consumer suing a corporation for punitive damages can lead to the
large verdict that raises previously discussed issues about punitive damages.
To punish the malefactor defendant, punitive damages should “sting”. To
34. Klass, supra note 31, at 90.
35. Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 352
(2003–2004).
36. Klass, supra note 31, at 154–55.
37. See discussion infra Part II; Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages After Exxon Shipping
Company v. Baker: The Quest for Predictability and the Role of Juries, 7 U. St. Thomas L.J. 182,
185–86 (2009).
38. Micari v. Mann, 126 Misc. 2d 422, 422–23, 481 N.Y.S.2d 967, 968 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
39. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
40. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
\\server05\productn\U\UST\7-1\UST101.txt unknown Seq: 10 14-MAY-10 8:35
10 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:1
that end, the jury needs to consider evidence of defendant’s wealth.41 The
plaintiff’s lawyer can then argue that this rich corporation has only one
nerve, the one that runs to its wallet. This cry to “send them a message”
resonates with populistic juries.
In addition to huge jury verdicts for punitive damages, consumer-pro-
tection punitive damages led to a reaction: tort reform. Tort reform occurs
in both legislatures and courts, and takes the form of both statutes and judi-
cial decisions. Punitive damages law is state common law; the state courts
make, apply, and change it, with legislative oversight. The tort reform judi-
cial decisions are part of the court’s common law technique.
An example of judicial tort reform is the opinion cited and discussed
above, the Maine Supreme Court’s decision in Tuttle v. Raymond.42 The
court based its decision on its common law power and the premise that
punitive damages serve valuable purposes but are subject to abuse. It initi-
ated two principles of containment: (1) the plaintiff must support the ele-
ments leading to punitive damages with clear and convincing evidence; (2)
the defendant’s misconduct threshold for punitive damages will be malice-
intent, not reckless disregard.43
Statutory caps on defendants’ appeal bonds are an example of legisla-
tive tort reform that benefit mostly punitive damages defendants.44 Other
legislative tort reform of punitive damages that includes caps and ratios will
be discussed below.
In 2009, the United States seemed to be exiting its third wave of legis-
lative tort reform, at least on the national level. Plaintiffs’ trial lawyers sup-
ported Democrats. Big business supported Republicans. The Democrats’
victories in the national elections of 2006 and 2008 slowed the momentum
for tort reform without ending it altogether. President Obama’s health re-
form package included malpractice screening panels, but the Republican
health reform bill would reach much further and cap a malpractice plain-
tiff’s pain and suffering damages.45
This background brings us to substantive due process. That doctrine
has been controversial since the Lochner Court found substantive standards
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and applied the
standards to hold that protective labor legislation violated an employee’s
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. e (1979). For pro and con, respectively,
see Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants’ Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 428–29
(1992); Kenneth S. Abraham  & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive Damages and The Rule of Law: The
Role of Defendant’s Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 415 (1989).
42. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985).
43. Id. at 1354.
44. Rendleman, supra note 21, at 1092.
45. Anne Zieger, Republicans Unsatisfied with Obama Malpractice Reform Stand, FIERCE
HEALTH CARE, Sept. 14, 2009, http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/story/republicans-unsatisfied-
obama-malpractice-reform-stand/2009-09-14; Robert Pear & David M. Herszenhorn, G.O.P.
Counters with a Health Plan of Its Own, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009, at A20.
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right to form a contract.46 Liberals and conservatives alike have excoriated
substantive due process as injuring both democracy and federalism. The
Supreme Court retreated from economic substantive due process beginning
in the 1930s.47
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that punitive damages were
an Eighth Amendment Excessive Fine.48 However, beginning in 1991, the
Supreme Court imposed substantive due process limits on punitive damages
in a line of decisions.49 Majority opinions have cloaked the quest for sub-
stantive standards to limit punitive damages in procedural terms: Unless the
state insists upon proper standards that will cabin the jury’s discretionary
authority, its punitive damages system may deprive a defendant of fair no-
tice of the severity of the penalty that the state may impose.50 The Supreme
Court’s due process punitive-damages decisions that required the judge to
instruct the jury and to conduct post-verdict judicial review are based on
procedural due process.51 However, the Court’s related idea that a state
court cannot impose grossly excessive punitive damages rests on principles
of substantive due process.52
In Gore, refined in Campbell and Williams, the Supreme Court articu-
lated post-verdict judicial review standards for gross excessiveness of puni-
tive damages as guideposts. These guideposts are: (1) the reprehensibility of
defendant’s conduct; (2) the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages; and (3) the comparable civil penalty.53 In Campbell, the Court,
after saying in dicta that 9:1 is usually the top punitive-compensatory ratio,
also mentioned a punitive-compensatory ratio of 1:1.54
With federal courts forbidding state courts’ punitive damages verdicts
as tort reform through substantive due process, state common law became a
federal constitutional issue. The Supreme Court’s punitive damages deci-
46. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56, 58–60 (1905).
47. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–32 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla.,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
48. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 267–68 (1989).
49. For cases in this line, see Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman
Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996);
Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp.,
509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
50. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416–17.
51. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18–23 (discussing jury instructions and post-verdict judicial review);
Oberg, 512 U.S. at 432 (declaring an Oregon statute, which essentially forbade post-verdict judi-
cial review of punitive damages, unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Cooper Indus., Inc., 512 U.S. at 436 (stating that the court’s post-verdict judicial
review of punitive damages is de novo).
52. A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The Error of Federal Exces-
siveness Jurisprudence, 79 S.CAL. L. REV. 1085, 1124 (2006).
53. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575, 580, 583; Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418–28; Williams, 549 U.S. at
353.
54. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 525.
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sions went from being hands-off in the 1980s to suggesting a 9:1 or even
1:1 ratio less than a decade later—a triumph of effective appellate advo-
cacy. The defendants’ lawyers were convincing a willing audience, the Su-
preme Court, to federalize and curb the state law of punitive damages. The
Supreme Court’s decisions are themselves examples of judicial tort reform,
an accomplishment of conservative activism, favoring business defendants
over consumer plaintiffs.55
Justices Scalia and Thomas, on the conservative side of the Court, and
Justice Ginsburg, on the moderate side, have dissented from the majorities’
use of substantive due process to limit punitive damages.56 These justices
are correct in their analysis of the discredited doctrine. My colleague, Pro-
fessor Ben Spencer, has demonstrated how slender, perhaps evanescent, the
majorities’ doctrine’s legitimacy and pedigree are.57 The advice I gave to
other common law countries at the Second International Conference on
Remedies in Auckland in 2007 was to eschew the substantive due process
approach.58 For reasons that will emerge below, Professor Spencer and I
lost that argument for now and for the foreseeable future.
A second thread runs through the Supreme Court’s substantive due
process punitive damages decisions. Gore, Campbell, and Williams were
consumer-protection punitive damages because the defendants’ misconduct
had caused widespread public harm. One question for the Supreme Court
was whether a jury may take harm to others into account when setting the
amount of punitive damages for a particular plaintiff.59 When there are mul-
tiple in-state victims, there is a possibility of overlapping and duplicative
punishment if another in-state plaintiff sues the same defendant later for
punitive damages. When there are out-of-state victims, in addition to a po-
tential for duplication, the punitive-damages state may intrude on another
state’s bailiwick, eroding federalism values and impinging on the second
state’s law and sovereignty.
Beginning with Gore, the Court has expressed concern that a state
court could punish a defendant with punitive damages for the defendant’s
misconduct that occurred out of the court’s state or that injured non-parties
to the punitive-damages litigation.60 Gore began with rigid federalism;
Campbell continued it. In Williams, which we return to below, the majority
55. Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 423, 432 (2007) (argu-
ing that the Supreme Court has a business-oriented conservative majority).
56. Williams, 549 U.S. at 361–64; Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429–39; Gore, 517 U.S. at
598–614.
57. Spencer, supra note 52, at 1118–46.
58. Doug Rendleman, A Plea to Reject the United States Supreme Court’s Due-Process Re-
view of Punitive Damages, in THE LAW OF REMEDIES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE COMMON LAW
(Jeff Berryman & Rick Bigwood eds.) (forthcoming 2010).
59. Williams, 549 U.S. at 353–54.
60. Id.; Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422–24; Gore, 517 U.S. at 572–73.
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insisted that punitive damages could punish a defendant only for harm to
the lawsuit’s discrete plaintiff, not for harm to other victims.
But are the guideposts workable? They may point a traveler in differ-
ent and contradictory directions. Suppose, for example, a tortfeasor shoots a
gun at plaintiff. He intends to kill her, but his bullet only hits her MP3
player, destroying it. When defendant’s serious misconduct causes plaintiff
a small amount of compensatory damages, the second guidepost, ratio,
which supports lower punitive damages, is inconsistent with the first guide-
post, reprehensibility, which supports higher punitive damages.61
As a safety valve, courts qualify ratio. The Supreme Court denies hav-
ing rigid benchmarks and examines potential harm, not actual compensa-
tory damages.62 The enormity of defendant’s wrongdoing, that is the
reprehensibility guidepost, overcomes ratio, the second guidepost.
The third guidepost, the comparable civil penalty, became a make-
weight. Indeed, if the state’s policy is to use punitive damages instead of
business regulation for consumer protection, a low civil penalty may sup-
port high punitive damages.63
Do the Gore-Campbell guideposts, as Justice Scalia quipped, set courts
on the road to nowhere?64  The guideposts turn out to be potentially contra-
dictory, to lack bright lines, and to point in no particular direction. Their
“fuzzy line” test either does not work or is difficult and time consuming to
administer.65 Creative courts find ways to distinguish them.66 Inconsistency
and abstruse, recondite distinctions ensure future decisions.
The Supreme Court’s five-to-four decision in 2007 in Phillip Morris
USA v. Williams complicated the Supreme Court’s punitive damages juris-
prudence in two ways.67  First, the Court’s tort reform due process majority
emerged more clearly. Before Williams (and leaving moderate Justice Gins-
burg out of the calculation), the conservative justices had split into two
groups: a business-oriented tort reform group that favored due process re-
view, and a states’ rights, anti-due process pair, Justices Scalia and Thomas,
along with Justice Ginsburg. The business-oriented tort-reform conserva-
tives had prevailed over the states’ rights conservatives. The two new Jus-
tices, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, whose views on substantive
due process review of punitive damages were unknown, might have joined
61. Caprice L. Roberts, Ratios, (Ir)rationality & Civil Rights Punitive Awards, 39 AKRON L.
REV. 1019, 1020–21 (2006); RENDLEMAN, supra note 6, at 144.
62. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424–25.
63. Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 701 So. 2d 524, 531 (Ala. 1997); Victor E. Schwartz, The
Supreme Court’s Common Law Approach to Excessive Punitive Damage Awards: A Guide for the
Development of State Law, 60 S.C. L. REV. 881, 892–93 (2009).
64. Gore, 517 U.S. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. Romero, supra note 25, at 139.
66. See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676–78 (7th Cir. 2003);
Willow Inn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224, 231, 233–38 (3d Cir. 2005).
67. 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
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the three dissenters to form a five-justice majority to repudiate the whole
line of due process decisions. Instead, Justices Roberts and Alito allied with
the tort reform majority in finding a substantive due process limit on a
plaintiff’s punitive damages judgment; they did not agree with Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg’s view that the Due Process Clause does not
restrict the amount of punitive damages.68
The second way the Williams decision affected the Supreme Court’s
punitive damages jurisprudence was by muddling the issue of whether the
defendant could be punished for harm to nonparties. The Oregon state
court’s jury had given the plaintiff $79.5 million punitive damages to pun-
ish Philip Morris for its negligence and deceit that had led to the lung-
cancer death of Jesse Williams, a smoker of three packages of Marlboro
cigarettes a day for forty-seven years.69 The cigarette company persuaded
five members of the Supreme Court that a jury instruction may have led the
jury to punish it for other smokers who were not parties before the court.
The Supreme Court majority made a distinction about when a punitive
damages jury may consider the defendant’s harm to persons who are not
plaintiffs. The jury, the majority wrote, may not assess punitive damages
“to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties, . . . those
who are essentially strangers to the litigation.”70
But three paragraphs later, the majority added the refinement that the
plaintiff may adduce evidence that defendant harmed nonparties to aid the
jury in assessing how reprehensible defendant’s misconduct was: “evidence
of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the [defendant’s] conduct
that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk to the general public,
and was particularly reprehensible.”71
Will this distinction be difficult to understand and administer? Dissent-
ing Justice Stevens understated his point when he said, “this nuance eludes
me.”72  “When a jury increases a punitive damages award because injuries
to third parties enhanced the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the
jury is by definition punishing the defendant—directly—for third-party
harm.”73
The Supreme Court remanded the plaintiff’s punitive damages to the
Oregon courts. The Oregon Supreme Court found a state law reason not to
review Philip Morris’s instruction: the defendant had not objected properly
68. Id. at 346.
69. Id. at 350.
70. Id. at 353.
71. Id. at 355.
72. Id. at 360; see also Michael P. Allen, Of Remedy, Juries, and State Regulation of Punitive
Damages: The Significance of Philip Morris v. Williams, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 343, 380
(2008).
73. Williams, 549 U.S. at 360.
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at trial.74 The U.S. Supreme Court declined Philip Morris’s request for fur-
ther review, leaving Plaintiff Williams’ punitive damages judgment in
place.75
The attributes of the Supreme Court’s punitive damages decisions
before Exxon were puzzling and consisted of potentially contradictory sub-
stantive due process guideposts that a lower court could either avoid or
deploy. While the guideposts might allow lower courts to suppress aberra-
tions and outliers, the observer could speculate that the federal constitu-
tional standards could stunt state legislative and judicial development of tort
law.
III: FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN PUNITIVE DAMAGES—
EXXON SHIPPING CO. V. BAKER
With the fault lines in common law punitive damages and the Supreme
Court’s substantive due process decisions in place, we turn to the Supreme
Court’s 2008 decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker.76 Professor Lempert
compared the Exxon Valdez’s oil spill to hurricane Katrina in New Orleans,
the 9-11 attacks, and the Three-Mile Island nuclear power plant.77 We
might add the Minnesota interstate bridge collapse at rush hour. In retro-
spect, these low-probability, high-harm events were, in effect, waiting to
happen because of precautions, safeguards, and oversight missed, ignored,
or left undone. For example, a double-hulled ship—which is now re-
quired—would have prevented the Exxon Valdez’s Prince William Sound
oil spill. We deal with but one small piece of the tragic oil spill: punitive
damages.
What legal events transpired after the Exxon Valdez’s massive March
1989 oil spill at Prince William Sound washed into the shoals of punitive
damages? A two-decade-long pavane that involved an angry Alaska jury, a
sympathetic federal trial judge, a court of appeals trying to interpret and
apply the unfolding series of Supreme Court due process punitive damages
decisions, and, the denouement under study, the Supreme Court imposing
its solution, which ended the protracted litigation without satisfying
anyone.78
The ship’s pilot, Joseph Hazelwood, was a not-rehabilitated relapsed
alcoholic. The plaintiffs presented evidence that his supervisors knew about
74. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 176 P.3d 1255, 1260, 1264 (Or. 2008), cert. granted sub.
nom. Philip Morris USA, Inc., v. Williams, 129 S. Ct. 2904 (2008), cert. dismissed, 129 S. Ct.
1436 (2009).
75. Philip Morris USA, Inc., v. Williams, 129 S. Ct. 2904 (2008), cert. dismissed, 129 S. Ct.
1436 (2009).
76. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
77. Richard Lempert, Low Probability/High Consequence Events: Dilemmas of Damages
Compensation, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 357–58 (2009).
78. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
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his condition. Hazelwood was drunk at the time of the collision, having
consumed 15 ounces of vodka, leading to a probable .241 blood alcohol
reading. He left the bridge before the Exxon Valdez ran aground. The unfor-
tunate third mate—who was not licensed for the crossing—apparently
missed a turn, leading to the collision.79
The consolidated civil cases were brought as maritime torts against
Exxon and Hazelwood by Prince William Sound fishermen to recover their
lost income as compensatory damages. The litigation fell under federal ad-
miralty jurisdiction, which stems from the United States Constitution, fed-
eral statutes, and in the absence of constitutional or statutory direction,
court-made federal common law.80 The third mate was negligent in hitting
the reef. His negligence, which would qualify plaintiffs for compensatory
damages, was not serious enough for the fishermen to recover punitive
damages. Exxon stipulated to negligence, leaving punitive damages to be
adjudicated. At Exxon’s request—an unusual request for a defendant—the
court aggregated 32,000 victims into a mandatory punitive damages class.81
The judge bifurcated (really trifurcated) the trial. Normally, bifurcation
occurs in punitive damages litigation to keep evidence of defendant’s
wealth from the first-stage liability jury, but this was unnecessary because
Exxon had stipulated to its agent’s negligence.
The first stage was to try Exxon’s liability for punitive damages. The
jury instruction on the defendants’ misconduct threshold called for it to find
reckless indifference. The jury found the corporation liable for its manage-
rial agent’s torts and sufficiently reckless to qualify for punitive damages.
Stage two was compensatory damages, which were set at $508 million.
Third was the amount of plaintiffs’ punitive damages. The jury instruction
required the jury to consider defendant’s reprehensibility and wealth, the
magnitude of the harm, and any mitigating factors. The jury’s punitive dam-
ages verdict was against Exxon for $5 billion and against co-defendant Ha-
zelwood for $5000.
The litigation took two trips to the court of appeals to consider the
Supreme Court’s unfolding constitutional due process guideposts. Both ap-
peals led to remands to the trial judge, ostensibly to reduce the amount of
punitive damages to a satisfactory amount. In the end, trial Judge Holland’s
decisions setting punitive damages at $4.5 billion and $4 billion did not
reduce the defendant’s punitive damages enough to satisfy the appellate
79. Id. at 2612–13.
80. John P. Jones, The Sky Has Not Fallen Yet on Punitive Damages in Admiralty Cases, 83
TUL. L. REV. 1289, 1294 (2009).
81. Linda S. Mullenix, Nine Lives: The Punitive Damage Class, U. KAN. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2010) (manuscript at 25–29) (manuscript for the October 2009 University of Kansas Law
Review Symposium Aggregate Litigation Since Ortiz v. Fibreboard).
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court, so the court of appeals lost patience with him  and itself remitted
Exxon’s $5 billion punitive damages jury verdict to $2.5 billion.82
The cliche´, “delay is the defendant’s friend,” proved more than usually
true for Exxon. During the protracted post-verdict delay period, the U.S.
Supreme Court’s due process decisions turned down the screws on punitive
damages and set the stage for that Court to circumscribe the Exxon Valdez
plaintiffs’ punitive damages.
At the Supreme Court, Exxon made three arguments. First, that the
Court should reject punitive damages against a defendant corporation, Ex-
xon, for the recklessness of its managerial agent, Hazelwood. On Exxon’s
vicarious liability for punitive damages, the Supreme Court divided four-
four, with Justice Alito not participating. That result upheld the court of
appeals’s decision, which had approved corporate liability. When it divides
evenly, the Court does not record the vote count; the smart money specu-
lates that Justice Souter joined the dissenters— Justices Stevens, Ginsburg,
and Breyer—in voting for vicarious liability. As a consequence, maritime
respondeat superior or vicarious liability remains an open question for two
reasons: first, because the Court divided evenly without reaching a prece-
dential decision; and second, because the Court may have found the com-
pany vicariously liable on the ground that Hazelwood, the ship’s master,
was a part of management, and not an ordinary employee.83
Exxon’s second argument was that the Clean Water Act preempted the
plaintiffs’ tort “claim” and prevented plaintiffs from recovering punitive
damages. In short, since Congress didn’t allow punitive damages, it forbade
them. The court of appeals had found no waiver and no preemption. The
Supreme Court also rejected preemption—Congress’s silence did not over-
ride maritime common law.84
Exxon’s third argument is our principal concern—that, as a matter of
federal maritime common law, the court of appeals’s $2.5 billion punitive
damages judgment was excessive because it exceeded punitive damages’
policy base of punishment and deterrence.
Maritime doctrines are a federal common law issue under the Constitu-
tion and federal statutes. In the absence of a statute, the federal courts have
common law power to develop and refine maritime doctrines.85 The Court’s
earlier punitive damages decisions were state common law with federal
constitutional oversight based on substantive due process post-verdict judi-
cial review. In contrast, Exxon is a common law decision based on federal
maritime common law in the absence of a statutory or constitutional
standard.
82. In re The Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 602 (9th Cir. 2006).
83. Jones, supra note 80, at 1298.
84. Id. at 1295.
85. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 3-1 (4th ed. 2010).
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The Supreme Court’s substantive due process opinions had recognized
that a state may empower its civil jury to punish a defendant for aggravated
misconduct and to deter that defendant as well as other potential wrongdo-
ers.86 Whether a maritime tort plaintiff could recover punitive damages had
not been clear earlier, but the Court’s Exxon decision resolved those doubts
in favor of punitive damages.87
The Supreme Court’s tort reform majority prevailed in Exxon. When
federalism issues were absent and the United States courts were exercising
federal common law making power, the states’ rights conservatives, Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas, joined the business-oriented conservatives.
For a decision about the narrow field of maritime punitive damages,
Justice Souter’s majority opinion involved a broad and sweeping examina-
tion of punitive damages. The majority opinion briefly surveyed punitive
damages’ common law beginnings. The survey mentioned the five states
that bar common law punitive damages, which included New Hampshire,
Souter’s home and retirement state.
The majority stated that punitive damages’ policy base was punish-
ment and deterrence. A former policy, to compensate plaintiffs’ intangible
injury not then available as damages, had been, the majority said,
“eclipsed.”88 The majority’s discussion of the reasons to take punitive dam-
ages from the defendant thus omits the reasons plaintiff should receive the
money. As discussed above, the reasons to give defendant’s punitive dam-
ages money to the plaintiff are to preserve the peace, to compensate plain-
tiff’s losses not measured under compensatory damages, and to finance
litigation.89 The majority, however, viewed punitive damages entirely from
the defendant’s side. Dissenting Justice Stevens identified compensating
uncompensated maritime injuries as supporting punitive damages in
principle.90
Citing a 2004 empirical study by Cornell scholars, the majority opin-
ion noted that the actual world of punitive damages belied their most severe
critics. In fact, punitive damages were infrequent, and when they did occur
they had a low compensatory-punitive ratio.91 Having come this far, the
majority might have dismissed Exxon’s excessiveness argument as a solu-
tion in search of a problem.
However, punitive damages outliers were what concerned Justice Sou-
ter—the stark unpredictability of huge punitive damages judgments and the
inconsistency between like situations. The majority opinion discussed the
incongruity between Dr. Gore’s $4 million jury verdict and a similar plain-
86. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA, Inc., v. Williams, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009).
87. Jones, supra note 80, at 1295–96.
88. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2620–21 (2008).
89. Ellis, supra note 24, at 3.
90. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2637 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
91. Id. at 2624.
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tiff with a repainted BMW who received a zero punitive damages verdict
from another Alabama jury. An eccentrically high punitive damages award
is unfair, Souter wrote, because a penalty should be predictable; there
should be a like penalty for like damages.92 However, as mentioned above,
the possibility of a large but randomized sanction may also deter a potential
miscreant.93
As the majority searched for principles of confinement, it examined
state jury instruction practices and post-verdict judicial review of punitive
damages by reviewing examples from Maryland and Alabama. It concluded
that verbal statements in instructions and abuse of discretion post-verdict
judicial review under passion-prejudice and shock-the-conscience stan-
dards, however elaborated, would not curb outlier juries’ punitive-damages
verdicts satisfactorily. In his dissent, however, Justice Stevens insisted that
abuse-of-discretion review would suffice and that the court of appeals’s
$2.5 billion judgment should stand because of Exxon’s aggravated miscon-
duct and the momentum of the trial and appellate courts’ decisions.94
As mentioned above, the Court’s due process standards from Gore and
Campbell, which suggested a 9:1 or even a 1:1 ratio, while declining to set
an absolute ratio, had proved to be difficult to administer because they left
discretion to the jury and to lower courts. In a flight from that discretion,
the Exxon Court’s majority analogized punitive damages to criminal sen-
tencing under detailed, but not mandatory, sentencing guidelines.95 More
precise standards than Gore-Campbell due process were needed. Only a
quantified approach, the opinion continued, will work.
The majority turned to quantified approaches: caps, multiples, and ra-
tios. A dollar cap on punitive damages—for example, Virginia’s $350,000
cap—should be rejected, the majority reasoned, because there is no stan-
dard tort and no standard tort defendant. A dollar cap like Virginia’s that
would crush a mere professor would be a trifle for a large and profitable
business corporation like Exxon, which earned $19.3 billion in 2009.96
The best approach is, the majority wrote, to peg punitive damages to
compensatory damages and to leave adjustments for later inflation to the
judge or jury.97 The majority turned to state and federal multiples and
examples.
This raised the question of whether the Court had the common law
power to set a multiple or ratio. Justice Souter referred to that subject as
92. Id. at 2625–26.
93. SCHELLING, supra note 26, at 200.
94. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2638.
95. Id. at 2627–29.
96. Steven Mufson, $19.3 Billion Profit is a 57% Drop for Exxon Mobil, WASH. POST, Feb.
2, 2010, at A12.
97. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2629.
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possibly, “too much . . . policy, too little . . . principle.”98 But, analogizing
to other precise common law cutoffs such as the court-created Rule Against
Perpetuities, the majority affirmed its ability as a common law court to ad-
judicate a precise line.99 Since courts make maritime common law, the ma-
jority reasoned, the Supreme Court has a free hand to mold that maritime
common law, subject to the Constitution and legislative oversight.100
The dissenters agreed that the Court had the common law authority or
ability to create a precise cutoff, but they disagreed with the way the major-
ity exercised its authority. Congress ought to be the branch that draws a
specific line, the dissenters argued, because a legislature is better able to
gather and evaluate the evidence than the Court. Moreover, an elected legis-
lature is a more legitimate and appropriate forum in which to set a precise
cap. Justice Stevens maintained that Congress should make the empirical
judgments, and since it hasn’t, a specific cap was unwarranted. He added
that state courts had not imposed numerical ratios.101
A quantified punitive damages cap is out of place in maritime common
law, Justice Stevens wrote, because of low compensatory damages in mari-
time law. He mentioned two specifically under-compensatory maritime
damages rules: the lack of recovery for defendant’s negligent infliction of
emotional distress and, more important here, the economic loss rule.102
Generally, a maritime plaintiff may not recover compensatory damages for
a defendant’s negligently inflicted economic loss—lost income for exam-
ple—unless that plaintiff also has an injury to person or property. The fisher
plaintiffs in Exxon could, however, recover compensatory damages for their
lost business income because they sued under a special maritime exception
to the economic loss rule for commercial fishermen.103 The majority dealt
with this point by dismissing the idea that punitive damages were a surro-
gate for plaintiffs’ losses that were uncompensated under compensatory
damages measures. However, this ignored the under-compensatory eco-
nomic loss rule and its narrow exceptions.
Having discovered its ability to quantify, the majority turned to state
ratios. It rejected the frequent legislative ratio of 3:1 because it thought that
an across-the-board cap wouldn’t work where, as here, the defendant’s mis-
conduct was reckless (not intentional), the result was profitless to the defen-
dant, and the defendant had already encountered large non-punitive
98. Id. at 2629.
99. Id. at 2629–30.
100. Id.
101. This is an interesting contrast with Sharkey and Klass’s argument that a state court has
common law power to establish a split-recovery system to divert punitive damages from the win-
ning plaintiff to a public purpose. See supra text accompanying notes 35–37.
102. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2636–37.
103. See id. at 2630 n.21.
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consequences. Nor did the need to extend punitive damages to encourage
private enforcement apply to the catastrophic consequences here.104
Citing the Cornell scholars’ empirical study, the Exxon majority
pointed out that judges’ and juries’ actual punitive to compensatory ratio
was less than 1:1—in fact, 0.65:1. So, the Campbell Court’s suggested 1:1
ratio, the Exxon majority said, was “a fair upper limit in such maritime
cases.”105
After the decision, however, the Cornell scholars criticized the major-
ity’s reasoning. The majority had taken their study’s summary figures to
support its conclusions about the unpredictability of punitive damages be-
cause of the high mean, or average. The Cornell scholars pointed out that
the high mean disappears when cases with low compensatory damages and
high punitive damages cases are removed. The ratio, although stable for
high compensatory damages, is more variable in low damages verdicts. The
majority’s use of summary figures in this way was, the Cornell scholars
concluded, an “unsupportable” use of statistics.106
The majority justified its 1:1 cap by lining up its considerations. The
plaintiffs sued under the commercial fishermen exception to the economic
loss rule. They lacked physical damages to persons or property. A plaintiff
class aggregated the plaintiffs into an economically viable litigation unit,
which facilitated their lawsuit.107 The total of plaintiffs’ compensatory dam-
ages was high and not inadequate. Finally, Exxon’s misconduct, albeit reck-
less, was neither greedy nor intentional.
Maritime common law, the majority concluded, capped these plain-
tiffs’ punitive damages against this defendant at $508 million, the amount
of the plaintiffs’ compensatory damages. The common law cap, it added,
might also be the substantive due process cap.108 Justices Scalia and
Thomas, who disagree with due process guideposts for state-court deci-
sions, agreed with this result under the Court’s common law maritime
power.109
In his dissent, Justice Breyer argued in favor of upholding the court of
appeals’s $2.5 billion punitive damages judgment. He maintained that a 1:1
104. See id. at 2634 n.28.
105. Id. at 2633.
106. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Variability in Punitive Damages: An Empirical Assessment of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker 2 (Cornell Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-011, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1392438.
107. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2618 n.6. The leading mass tort scholar,
Linda Mullenix, hopes there won’t be any more punitive damages class actions. Mullenix, supra
note 81. But see James M. Underwood, Road to Nowhere or Jurisprudential U-turn? The Intersec-
tion of Punitive Damage Class Actions and the Due Process Clause, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
763, 796–806 (2009) (favoring Rule 23(b)(3) punitive damages class actions).
108. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2634 n.28.
109. Id. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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ratio should have a safety valve for the exceptional case and that this was
the exceptional case.110
In her separate dissent, Justice Ginsburg identified the problem as the
outlier punitive damages verdict. She argued that the traditional approach to
post-verdict judicial review works satisfactorily to suppress those excep-
tions. She also speculated that the majority’s next move in its tort reform
campaign against punitive damages might be a 1:1 punitive damages-com-
pensatory damages ratio in due process post-verdict judicial review.
IV: CONCLUSIONS
What does our crystal ball portend for punitive damages after Exxon?
What future developments will define the Exxon decision’s influence?
By negative inference from the majority’s reasoning, a 1:1 ratio or cap
may not be imposed under all circumstances. These include when defen-
dant’s misconduct is intentional, malicious, greedy, or unlikely to be dis-
covered. Nor should the cap govern when plaintiff’s harm is either hard to
detect or difficult to sue for because a plaintiff with small compensatory
damages lacks economic incentive to sue.111
Professor Jones asked whether the Exxon court’s decision for a 1:1 cap
on punitive damages only applied to plaintiffs suing under the commercial
fishermen exception to the maritime economic loss rule.112 However, others
will argue that Exxon’s 1:1 ratio ought to be applied to federal constitu-
tional, common, and statutory law. As Justice Ginsburg feared, Exxon may
portend a new strictness in due process post-verdict judicial review of state
punitive damages.
Is Exxon a signal to state courts as a common law precedent? In con-
tending with the problem of the outlier punitive damages verdict, tort re-
formers adduced the solution of capping punitive damages at the level of
plaintiff’s compensatory damages. A state supreme court should, they ar-
gued, follow Exxon as a sound common law precedent in developing a
“more predictable civil justice system.”113
Use of Exxon as common law precedent would be awkward because
the decision itself stretches the common law technique. A court following
common law reasoning normally develops rules in the course of applying
them. The court will modify, even overrule, existing rules to adopt the law
to changing social and economic conditions. So far, so good for the Exxon
Court if it assumed that social and economic conditions supported its con-
clusion. When, however, the particular dispute is unrepresentative, an “out-
110. Id. at 2640.
111. Id. at 2622.
112. Jones, supra note 80, at 1297.
113. Schwartz, supra note 63, at 914. But see Klass, supra note 37, at 201 (“Regardless of
whether these limitations on punitive damages are a good idea, the Court’s approach is unfortu-
nate for many reasons.”).
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rider” like Exxon, then a court’s common law reasoning may be a
suboptimal technique to develop a rule in that particular dispute to govern
future disputes.114 Focusing its reasoning as it does on its statutory and
constitutional docket, the Supreme Court, not used to incremental common
law change, took giant steps where baby steps would have been wiser.
Quantified standards, even qualified ones, are scarce in common law deci-
sion-making.
In addition to suboptimal common law technique, the Exxon court
downgraded common law post-verdict judicial review, ignored reasons to
give punitive damages to plaintiffs, neglected to examine the special attrib-
utes of environmental and economic loss rule damages, and misused statis-
tics. Too anxious to reverse a well-litigated and well-reviewed judgment, it
imposed a rigid solution that will be problematic in future application.
The Court’s Exxon decision is reality for now. In dealing with it,
courts and legislatures should pay attention to Professors Leo Romero,
Catherine Sharkey, and Alexandra Klass.
Professor Romero compared the Supreme Court’s review of punitive
damages to its review of criminal sentencing. Legislatures, he advised,
should establish guidelines and limits on punitive damages because an
elected legislature is more democratic and better fitted than a court to make
policy judgments. The legislature, he argued, should define the qualifying
misconduct for punitive damages and set the minimum and maximum pun-
ishment. A punitive damages statute would mean that courts might honor
the imprimatur from both the legislature and the jury.115
The Supreme Court is deferential to legislatures in weighing whether
statutory criminal sentences are cruel and unusual punishment. For exam-
ple, in Ewing v. California, a court sentenced a recidivist criminal under a
state “three strikes” statute to twenty-five years to life for stealing golf
clubs. Citing the state legislature’s decision in a statute, the Supreme Court
refused to reverse.116 The punitive damages equivalent of twenty-five years
to life for stealing golf clubs is a ratio of punishment to harm that exceeds
1:1.117 In other words, we can expect the Supreme Court to defer more to a
statutory punitive damages regime than we have observed for a common
law regime.
An unyielding ratio is a crude and unsatisfactory technique to apply to
measure the proportion between misconduct and injury. The techniques
might be a cap, caps with safety valves, a multiple, or guidelines based on
retribution factors like defendant’s misconduct and victims’ actual or poten-
tial harm. A court cannot imprison or incapacitate a corporation, only its
114. FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REA-
SONING 111 (2009).
115. Romero, supra note 25; Romero, supra note 31, at 170–75.
116. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003).
117. Romero, supra note 25, at 142–44.
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agents. To the corporation, punitive damages and a criminal fine are simi-
lar, although it probably suffers fewer stigmas from punitive damages.
From the perspective of deterrence, the defendant corporation is economi-
cally indifferent to whether the private plaintiff or the government receives
the money.
If a state transfers punitive damages from the exclusive business of
juries and judges and develops legislative or statutory definitions, a jury’s
large punitive damages verdict for a defendant’s exacerbated misconduct
may well evade a court’s excessiveness review. Legislative initiative might
resuscitate Professor Klass’s argument for environmental punitive damages
that exceed a single-digit ratio.118
A legislature studying Professor Romero’s argument for punitive dam-
ages legislation would be well advised to examine Professor Catherine
Sharkey’s proposal for societal compensation. When a corporate defendant
causes widespread injury, it will not always be possible to identify everyone
harmed; legislative implementation of her proposal for compensatory socie-
tal damages would assure defendant pays enough to structure its incentives
to correct its deficiencies. What I have called “consumer-protection punitive
damages” for widespread harm accords, in effect, class action recovery in
the form of damages exceeding plaintiff’s compensation, but without the
class action’s protection for the defendant. Her proposal would be fairer to
defendants and compensate other victims not before the court.119 Professor
Sharkey’s article, based on sexual harassment in the workplace and im-
proper police strip searches, advocated a split-recovery system. Professor
Klass adopted this split-recovery proposal for defendants’ under-valued and
under-compensated environmental harm, a proposal that has a salutary po-
tential for environmental torts.120
A Washington and Lee Law School classroom is usually a reliable
place to take the temperature of conservative America. The Exxon court’s
1:1 ratio did not, however, have many friends in my fall 2009 Remedies
class. Why? For reasons examined above, in 2010, the Supreme Court is a
lagging indicator, not only more conservative than the country as a whole; it
is more conservative than most conservatives. One response is for other
courts to confine the Court’s rigid result to the situation before it, the mari-
time tort. Legislatures, moreover, might consider the Court’s questionable
solution to be an invitation to the revisions that Professors Romero,
Sharkey, and Klass suggest.
118. Klass, supra  note 31, at 87; see Romero, supra note 31, at 173–75.
119. Sharkey, supra note 35, at 391; see Sharkey, supra note 25, at 51–53.
120. Klass, supra note 31, at 153–59.
